Agglomeration and State Personal Income Taxes: Time to Apportion (With Critical Commentary on New Hampshire’s Complaint Against Massachusetts) by Darien Shanske
Fordham Urban Law Journal 
Volume 48 
Number 4 The Impacts of Financial Crisis on 
Urban Environments: Past, Present, And Future 
Article 5 
2021 
Agglomeration and State Personal Income Taxes: Time to 
Apportion (With Critical Commentary on New Hampshire’s 
Complaint Against Massachusetts) 
Darien Shanske 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj 
Recommended Citation 
Darien Shanske, Agglomeration and State Personal Income Taxes: Time to Apportion (With Critical 
Commentary on New Hampshire’s Complaint Against Massachusetts), 48 Fordham Urb. L.J. 949 (2021). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol48/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 




AGGLOMERATION AND STATE PERSONAL 
INCOME TAXES: TIME TO APPORTION     
(WITH CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON NEW 
HAMPSHIRE’S COMPLAINT AGAINST 
MASSACHUSETTS) 
Darien Shanske* 
Introduction .................................................................................... 949 
I. Background ................................................................................. 950 
A. The Lawsuit: New Hampshire v. Massachusetts ........ 950 
B. Agglomeration Economics ............................................ 951 
C. Doctrine ........................................................................... 954 
II. Mistaken Contentions of New Hampshire and Its Amici .... 958 
III. Constitutional Does Not Mean Optimal: Other Options ... 961 
Conclusion: The Court Should Not Dictate a Rule ................... 964 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes easy cases make bad law — or at least might make bad 
law.  The Supreme Court is currently considering granting certiorari in 
New Hampshire v. Massachusetts. 1   At issue is the State of New 
Hampshire’s (and its amici’s) claim that Massachusetts’s insistence on 
applying its income tax to residents of New Hampshire, who once 
commuted to work for businesses in Massachusetts but now remotely 
work for those businesses in New Hampshire because of the COVID-
19 pandemic, violates the Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce 
 
* Many thanks to Nestor Davidson, Brad Joondeph, Alan Morrison, Dan Rodriguez, 
Erin Scharff, Christine Kim, and all the participants in the Fordham Urban Law 
Journal’s 2020 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium. I also want to thank the editors of the 
Fordham Urban Law Journal for exceptional editing. All mistakes are my own. 
 1. New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, SCOTUSBLOG [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG], 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/new-hampshire-v-massachusetts/ 
[https://perma.cc/F8YY-RC3X] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021). 
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Clause.2  The claim is simple and seductive: if these New Hampshire 
residents barely leave their own homes, much less their state, how can 
it accord with due process for Massachusetts to tax them? 
This simple analysis, however, should be rejected because it would 
be applying an old economy heuristic (you earn where you physically 
are) to a new economy problem (work can happen in many places).  If 
the Supreme Court agrees to hear this case (and I think it should not), 
and if it were to hold in favor of New Hampshire (and I argue in this 
Essay that it should not), it would deal a severe and almost comically 
mistimed blow to the modern urban economy by undermining the 
ability of central urban areas to impose income taxes on an increasingly 
mobile workforce.3 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides background 
about the current lawsuit as well as the policy and doctrinal issues it 
raises.  Part II argues why Massachusetts’s arguments against the 
taxation of remote workers are incorrect as a matter of constitutional 
law.  Part III acknowledges that current state law regarding the 
sourcing of employee income is not ideal from a policy perspective and 
suggests an old solution to this relatively new problem: apportionment 
by formula.  In this context, apportionment means achieving a 
reasonable division as to a matter in which there is no clear right 
answer.  In the case of a remote employee living in one state but 
working remotely in an agglomeration of talent made possible by 
another state, this Part argues that the right answer is that both states 
have some reasonable claim to a portion of that worker’s income. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Lawsuit: New Hampshire v. Massachusetts 
As of the time of writing this Essay, New Hampshire has asked the 
Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction over its claim that 
Massachusetts regulators’ choice to treat no-longer commuting New 
Hampshire residents as Massachusetts employees violates the Due 
Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause.4  The Supreme Court 
has called for the U.S. Solicitor General’s view on the matter.5 
 
 2. See Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint at 1–2, New Hampshire v. 
Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Oct. 19, 2020) [hereinafter New Hampshire Complaint]. 
 3. See Erin Scharff, Cities on Their Own: Local Revenue When Federalism Fails, 
48 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919 (2021) (explaining the importance of having multiple broad 
tax bases). 
 4. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
 5. See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1. 
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On a procedural level, the case faces many challenges, including 
whether New Hampshire has standing and whether this is the right case 
at the right stage of development for the Court to exercise original 
jurisdiction.6  I am inclined to agree with Massachusetts that this is not 
a case the Court should hear,7 but I will leave those arguments to one 
side and consider the merits of the case in this Essay.  It is worth getting 
to the merits because New Hampshire and its many amici are surely 
right that the basic issues here are important and unlikely to go away.8  
In particular, this case presents the questions of when and how much a 
state can tax remote employees.  New Hampshire and its amici argue 
that New Hampshire residents who have not worked in Massachusetts 
since March 2020 should not be subject to Massachusetts’s personal 
income tax. 
B. Agglomeration Economics 
On its face, one might think this fight is a battle between states.  
States are the sovereigns imposing these income taxes, and it is states 
that are given the privilege of asking for the Court’s original 
jurisdiction.  This case, however, is about cities — or, at least, the 
proper resolution of the case requires thinking about cities.  This is not 
because the dormant Commerce Clause applies differently to cities.9  
Rather, it is because thinking about cities provides the answer to the 
question of whether a state like Massachusetts is entitled to tax these 
remote workers. 
One might question why Massachusetts is taxing New Hampshire 
residents who have not been in the state for months and are not likely 
to come back for months, but the puzzle here is something of an optical 
illusion.  Many of New Hampshire’s residents are clustered around the 
border of Massachusetts because of its proximity to Boston.10  From 
 
 6. See Brief in Opposition to Motion for Leave to File Complaint at 11–12, New 
Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 11, 2020). 
 7. Even Steve Wlodychak, a prominent commentator who agrees with New 
Hampshire, does not think that the Court will or should take the case. See generally 
Steve Wlodychak, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts: Wrong Court, Right Case, 99 
TAX NOTES ST. 107 (2021). 
 8. For a list of New Hampshire’s amici curiae, see SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1. 
 9. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 
353, 361 (1992). 
 10. See KENNETH JOHNSON, CARSEY INST., NEW HAMPSHIRE DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (2012), 
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=carsey 
[https://perma.cc/4VMD-CYKV]; Byron Lutz, Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the 
Connection Between Property Taxes and Residential Capital Investment, 7 AM. ECON. 
J. 300, 317 (2015); see also New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 59–60. 
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the perspective of real economic units, these New Hampshire residents 
are functionally residents of the greater Boston metropolitan area.  It 
is not surprising or odd that the Boston metropolitan area would want 
to tax residents, even if those residents technically live in a different 
state. 
But why are these residents of New Hampshire paying higher 
housing prices to live near Boston? 11   Not so very long ago, the 
dominant economic model of local jurisdictions featured people and 
businesses shopping among competing jurisdictions for the best deal — 
the best set of amenities at the best price.12   This is the so-called 
Tiebout model,13 and there is some evidence that “homevoters” do 
behave in this way.14  To give a classic example, homebuyers will often 
be very aware of the quality of local public schools and will pay more 
— or less — for a home based on the perceived qualities of the schools 
in a given school district.15 
When New Hampshire complains in the current suit that it has an 
“advantage” because it does not levy an income tax — an advantage 
that Massachusetts undermines — it is in effect stating that it is 
engaging in Tiebout-type competition with the rest of the Boston 
metropolitan area.16  However, armed with only the Tiebout model, it 
is odd that so many people are clustered together and paying high 
housing prices around Boston, whether with income taxes or not.  And, 
even more peculiarly, these New Hampshire residents were not so 
hostile to state income taxes that, at least until the pandemic, they were 
commuting into Massachusetts and incurring a state personal income 
tax.  The Tiebout model cannot explain this behavior.  Considering 
 
 11. See Lutz, supra note 10, at 300. 
 12. See David Schleicher, Local Government Law’s “Law and ___” Problem, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1951, 1958 (2013) (reviewing literature). 
 13. For the seminal article on the topic, see Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416 (1956). See also Darien Shanske, Above 
All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of (and Solution 
to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 672–73 (2010) (providing 
additional discussion and context of the Tiebout model). 
 14. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES (2001) (amassing evidence for the Tiebout model); see also Richard Briffault, 
Our Localism: Part II — Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 405–06, 
416–17 (1990). 
 15. See, e.g., Michele Lerner, School Quality Has a Mighty Influence on 




 16. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 15. 
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only housing prices, given there is no income tax anywhere in New 
Hampshire, why are so many residents of New Hampshire paying more 
to live near Massachusetts? 
The newer economic models revolve around the benefits of 
agglomeration — of bunching together.  Density in businesses, 
especially similar types of businesses, can be a big positive, especially 
for the flow of ideas.17  If, for example, a person works as a software 
engineer, then it makes sense to live near a thriving software industry.  
This is good not only for obtaining a job to begin with but to sharpen 
skills, hire other employees, and network to obtain one’s next job.  
Thus, the answer to the riddle of the cluster around the border of 
Massachusetts: there is an agglomeration of talent in the Boston area 
that these workers benefit from. 
Agglomeration economics is an essential tool for explaining why 
metropolitan areas exist at all, and, though the types of agglomeration 
might change in the future, it seems doubtful that its benefits will ever 
completely go away. 18   I acknowledge that this is something of 
conjecture.  If agglomerations were ever not to matter, or not matter 
very much, then the analysis that followed might be different, at least 
as a policy matter. 
It turns out that major agglomerations have often not followed state 
or interstate lines.  While this has led to a variety of governance issues 
that should generally prompt reconsideration of several constitutional 
doctrines and of how the federal government should regulate interstate 
taxation, a greater discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
Essay.  Instead, this Essay questions whether the Supreme Court 
should address the issue of increased remote work by imposing a new 
physical presence rule.  That such a rule is not advisable is made 
apparent by the example of agglomerations that cross state lines — that 
is the very case before the Court.  If there were such a rule, then a 
software engineer in the greater Boston area who lives in New 
Hampshire could carefully avoid some physical presence threshold as 
to Massachusetts, and thus avoid paying personal income tax to the 
primary jurisdiction enabling that worker to earn a high income. 
 
 17. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: 
Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the United States, 47 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 983, 1023 (2009) (emphasizing information spillovers); Daniel B. 
Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637, 
641–43 (2012) (summarizing literature and identifying three benefits of agglomeration: 
reduced transportation costs, larger market size, and information spillovers). 
 18. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Jerry Seinfeld Is Right About New York’s Future, CNN 
(Aug. 30, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/27/opinions/jerry-seinfeld-
right-about-new-york-sachs/index.html [https://perma.cc/HE53-7M2G]. 
954 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
The Supreme Court excised a similar physical presence rule in a 2018 
case called South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.19  For the 50 years prior to 
Wayfair, the Court had held that only remote vendors with a physical 
presence in a state could be forced to collect the use tax on behalf of 
the state.  Now, the post-Wayfair rule dictates that any business with a 
substantial economic presence in the state can be forced to collect the 
use tax.  A similar standard should, and does, govern whether a state 
can impose an income tax. 
C. Doctrine 
When a state imposes a tax, the tax can be challenged on numerous 
constitutional grounds.  The most important ones — and the primary 
ones relied on in New Hampshire v. Massachusetts — involve the Due 
Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause.  The Due Process 
Clause “‘requires some definite link, some minimum connection, 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,’ 
and that the ‘income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be 
rationally related to values connected with the taxing State.’”20  Since 
1992, due process has not required that a taxpayer be physically present 
in a state. 21   New Hampshire and its amici assert, however, that 
Massachusetts’s claim to the income of formerly non-remote 
employees does not even satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause. 
Derived from Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, the dormant 
Commerce Clause subjects a state tax to a four-part test: (1) a state can 
only impose a tax on an activity with which it has a substantial nexus, 
(2) the tax must be fairly apportioned, (3) the tax must not discriminate 
against out-of-state taxpayers, and (4) the tax must have a fair relation 
to state services. 22   In this case, only two prongs are particularly 
relevant — (1) substantial nexus and (2) fair apportionment.  First, 
regarding the substantial nexus, the Court in Wayfair declared that it 
would no longer require physical presence. 23   Rather, some 
combination of economic and virtual contacts could suffice.24 
 
 19. See 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 20. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954); and then quoting 
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 273 (1978)), overruled in part by Wayfair, 138 
S. Ct. at 2099. 
 21. See id. at 307. 
 22. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 23. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 24. See id. 
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Second, regarding fair apportionment, the basic idea is that a state 
can only tax a reasonable share of the income of an interstate 
enterprise, and thus it may not (a) in effect, tax income earned 
elsewhere or otherwise (b) overtax or overburden interstate 
businesses.25  For example, consider Apple.  California and New York 
can tax Apple because it is a major multistate business with substantial 
economic presence in both states.  Assume both states have a 5% 
corporate income tax and Apple has $100 billion in income.  If both 
California and New York tax Apple on all of its income, then Apple’s 
income will be taxed twice.  In other words, some states will necessarily 
be taxing income earned out of state if all the income of an interstate 
business is being taxed multiple times.  Imagine all 50 states imposed 
such a tax on all of Apple’s income — that would be 5% * $100bn * 50 
= $250bn — $250 billion in taxes on $100 billion in total income.  
Apportionment is needed to ensure Apple’s $100 billion income is 
reasonably divided among the states. 
States first encountered the problem of taxing large multi-
jurisdictional businesses with the railroad industry in the nineteenth 
century.  The states argued that the pieces of property occupied by 
railroad tracks were part of a larger, unified system that was very 
valuable.  In turn, railroads argued that their property value was 
minimal because they just owned a little bit of land, wood, and iron 
stakes.  The Supreme Court agreed with the states. 26   Thus, the 
“unitary business principle” was born, permitting states to consider 
that they are taxing a unitary business even if the value or income of 
that business is earned in several states. 
Acceptance of the unitary business principle immediately led to 
another conundrum, namely, how to divide up the value or income of 
a unitary business.  The Supreme Court adopted a flexible rule 
permitting any reasonable formula and placed the burden on the 
taxpayer to “prove by ‘clear and cogent evidence’ that the income 
attributed to the State is in fact ‘out of all appropriate proportions to 
the business transacted in that State.’”27  Thus, in the case of railroads, 
a state could apportion the value of a railroad on the basis of the 
percentage of tracks in the state. 
 
 25. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and 
the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (2002). 
 26. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 228–29 (1897); 
State R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 611–12 (1875); In re Del. R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. 206, 219–
20 (1873). 
 27. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170 (1983) (quoting Hans 
Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 135 (1931)). 
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This permissibility as to formulas is appropriate for several 
reasons.28  First, for a unitary business, locating the exact source of its 
income or value is difficult, if not impossible.  Where is the value of an 
interstate railroad?  The great stations are worthless without humble 
tracks crossing great distances with nothing around.  Second, state tax 
bases are often opaque — and deliberately so — which makes it 
difficult to identify the tax base to be apportioned.  As an example, 
consider Texas’s Margin Tax.29  The tax base of the Texas Margin Tax 
is determined by using one of four methods of calculation, whichever 
method results in a lower margin: (1) permitting a deduction of total 
gross revenue by 30%, (2) a deduction of $1 million, (3) a deduction by 
costs of goods sold, or (4) a deduction by employee compensation.30  
To the extent this tax is measured by 30% of gross receipts, it is a gross 
receipts tax.  To the extent this tax is measured by a deduction for the 
cost of goods sold for some taxpayers, it is more a type of income tax.  
Therefore, the Texas Margin Tax, unlike a traditional income tax or 
property tax, is not targeted towards one type of value.  The tax surely 
needs to be apportioned — and it is — by proportion of sales within 
the state; this measure, however, is very rough because the underlying 
value that Texas is trying to tax a fair proportion of is protean.  If the 
apportionment rule needs to hew closely to the underlying theory of 
the tax, the problem would not simply be about creating endless work 
for economists and lawyers (the classic railroad problem), but that the 
underlying tax base is hard to quantify even without the problem of 
interstate apportionment.  But the states are allowed to levy 
complicated, hybrid taxes.  Thus, a reasonable attempt by a state to tax 
only its fair share should and does suffice. 
One final aspect of current doctrine is important.  There are two 
principles on which a government can impose a tax: residence (where 
one lives) and source (where one earns income).  Thus, for example, 
California can tax a person on all of her income, including the rental 
property she might own in New York, because she is a resident.  New 
York can also tax the same person on that rental income.  In order to 
avoid double taxation on the rental income, the national and 
international norm is that the jurisdiction of residence grants a credit 
to the resident taxpayers for taxes paid to the source jurisdiction. 
 
 28. See generally Joondeph, supra note 25. 
 29. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.106(a) (West 2018). 
 30. See id. 
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As a matter of federal constitutional law, taxing according to both 
principles is well established.31  Federal constitutional law does not, 
however, prescribe a rule of priority between residence and source.32  
What federal constitutional law does is impose a rule called “internal 
consistency,”33 which means a state cannot choose a tax structure that, 
if universally copied, would result in double taxation.  So, a state can 
tax only on the basis of residence or source because, if every state did 
so, then interstate taxpayers would be no worse off.34  Once a state 
taxes on the basis of residence and source, then the state must give 
credits (unless it is going to tax its own residents who earn income in-
state twice), as they essentially all do, and prioritize the source 
jurisdiction, which all states do. 
Both New York and New Jersey impose income taxes that follow 
this basic structure.  As a result, when a New Jersey resident commutes 
to New York, that employee is taxed by New York (source) first.  New 
Jersey, as the resident state, then gets to tax its resident on the same 
income but gives a credit for paying taxes to New York.  If New York 
taxes are as high or higher than New Jersey taxes, then New Jersey 
effectively gets no personal income tax revenue from these residents. 
New Jersey has joined New Hampshire as an amicus in the current 
litigation, arguing that New York’s apportionment rule violates the 
Due Process Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. 35  
Specifically, New Jersey argues that New York’s longstanding rule for 
assessing whether an employee is a resident in the state, the 
“convenience of the employer test,” is unconstitutional because it has 
the effect of sourcing the income of remote workers to New York.36 
 
 31. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 312–13 (1937) 
(recognizing the principle of taxing according to residence); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 
37, 51 (1920) (recognizing the principle of taxing according to source). 
 32. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1803–05 
(2015). 
 33. Id. at 1804. 
 34. See generally Bradley W. Joondeph, The States’ Multiple Taxation of Personal 
Income, 71 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 121 (2020). 
 35. Brief for States of New Jersey et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff at 
5–6, New Hampshire v. Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 22, 2020). 
 36. See id. For a more in-depth discussion of this test, see infra Part II. Note that 
there is a separate question as to whether this is how the New York test should be 
interpreted to operate during the COVID-19 pandemic. See Walter Hellerstein, 
Nonresident NY Employees Are Not Currently Working at Home for Their 
‘Convenience,’ TAX NOTES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-
analysis/nonresident-ny-employees-are-not-currently-working-home-their-
convenience/2020/04/02/2cbx8 [https://perma.cc/7MGV-4RHC]. The fact that the New 
York test might not even have the purportedly unconstitutional effect is another 
reason the Court should not take this case. 
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II. MISTAKEN CONTENTIONS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE AND ITS AMICI 
New Hampshire and its amici make two primary contentions.  First, 
they argue that the Massachusetts regulation is unconstitutional 
because it asserts nexus under the Due Process Clause and dormant 
Commerce Clause on taxpayers who are not residents in the state and 
whose income is only sourced to the state because of their employers’ 
location.37  Second, they argue that the tax is unconstitutional under 
the Due Process Clause and dormant Commerce Clause because it is 
not fairly apportioned.38 
New Hampshire and its amici’s arguments regarding the nexus are 
mistaken.39  The Supreme Court held 29 years ago in Quill that physical 
presence is not required for nexus under the Due Process Clause,40 and 
it held three years ago in Wayfair that physical presence is also not 
required for nexus under the dormant Commerce Clause. 41  
Accordingly, under current law, a business can incur the liability to 
collect the use tax with as little as $100,000 in sales made within a 
state. 42   It is hard to understand why an employee who formerly 
worked full-time out of an office in Boston does not continue to have 
nexus with Massachusetts sufficient to pay a tax if that employee is 
working remotely for a Massachusetts employer on account of a public 
health emergency.  To be sure, there is a different question if the 
employee were never to return to commuting, but that is not the 
question in this case. 
And the move from physical presence was, and is, the right move.  
As all the Justices agreed in Wayfair, it was never a constitutional 
requirement to base nexus to tax on physical presence, and, as the 
majority in Wayfair emphasized, this heuristic was particularly 
 
 37. See New Hampshire Complaint, supra note 2, at 91. 
 38. See id. at 92. 
 39. The main state and local tax treatise arrives at a similar, if not more tentative, 
conclusion about the requirement of physical presence for nexus. See WALTER 
HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION § 20.05, at 12 (3d ed. 2020). Note that the same treatise 
is skeptical of the New York rule and believes it requires apportionment. See id. At 
the level of policy, I think this is correct, but I disagree that this is required as a matter 
of law. See discussion supra Part I. 
 40. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992). 
 41. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
 42. For another interesting parallel, see International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin 
Department of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 441 (1944). There, the Court explained that 
“[p]ersonal presence within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to 
the constitutional levy of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation’s Wisconsin 
earnings as is distributed to them.” Id. at 441. If out-of-state shareholders can be taxed 
on income reasonably sourced to a state, then why should out-of-state employees not 
be so taxed? 
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problematic in the age of the internet.43  Wayfair was a case about 
collection of the use tax by businesses, but the same logic holds for 
individuals.  If virtual contacts suffice for nexus for a business, what is 
the warrant for a physical presence rule for individuals as matter of 
constitutional law?  And so there are important differences between 
individuals and businesses of course, and one might quite reasonably 
argue that residence is more important for individuals. 44   Yet the 
question is whether those differences are of sufficient weight to be 
made into a constitutional principle.  I think these differences are not 
because that would, in effect, be to deny that a state may assert nexus 
based on the lessons of aggregation economics.  To make the point 
another way, New Hampshire and its amici are likely right that there is 
going to be more remote work in the future, but this means it is all the 
more important that a tax nexus not be entwined with an outdated 
understanding of where and how work happens.  If more work is to be 
done remotely in the future, then it is all the more important that 
physical presence not be made a constitutional bright line rule again. 
Agglomeration economics addresses the underlying intuition that it 
is not fair to tax someone who is not physically present or not present 
full time.  Cities are enabling the agglomerations of talent and capital 
that make it possible for earning to happen in these metropolitan areas, 
especially for those with higher salaries.  This is even more true when 
state lines happen to cut through a metropolitan area.  It is one thing 
for a remote worker in Montana to challenge the Massachusetts or 
New York rules,45 but the residents in New Hampshire and New Jersey 
are, in fact, typically living in the Boston and New York metropolitan 
areas. 
New Hampshire and its amici’s second argument as to 
apportionment presents trickier questions.  The first step is to return 
to the two basic grounds for taxation: residence and source.  States with 
income taxes can tax all of the income of their residents but give a 
credit for tax paid on income earned with a source in another state.  
States will then tax non-residents on their in-state source income.  
 
 43. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2095 (“A virtual showroom can show far more 
inventory, in far more detail, and with greater opportunities for consumer and seller 
interaction than might be possible for local stores. Yet the continuous and pervasive 
virtual presence of retailers today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should 
not maintain a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.”). 
 44. See generally Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Taxing Teleworkers, 55 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 45. And to be clear, I think the source states do have a claim on the income of a 
worker in Montana, just a lesser one. See discussion infra Part III for thoughts on how 
to administer the tax in this case. 
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There is no question that Massachusetts, as the source state, cannot tax 
the employees on all of their income; it can only tax their income with 
a source in the state.46 
Does Massachusetts’s apportionment rule fail the (appropriately) 
flexible standard for apportionment?  It seems not.  Until the beginning 
of March 2020, few people, if anyone, challenged the idea that the state 
in which an employee worked can tax all of that employee’s income as 
sourced to the state because those services were physically performed 
in the state.  It seems reasonable for Massachusetts to assume that it 
remains the source for the length of the pandemic because those 
workers will return.  They will return because of the reason they were 
there to begin with — these workers (and their employers) benefit by 
being located next to similar workers.  To the extent that some workers 
will not return, then at some point, they will not be Massachusetts 
employees anymore, but Massachusetts does not have to assume that 
none will return.47 
But, as to both the nexus and apportionment questions, one might 
ask how far this can go.  Suppose a New Hampshire resident never 
returns to work in Massachusetts even after the pandemic is over.  
Surely, at some point, Massachusetts cannot tax the employee, right?  
The answer is yes and no.  On the one hand, there is a point at which 
Massachusetts cannot tax a remotely working New Hampshire resident 
employed by a Massachusetts taxpayer as if that employee commuted 
into Massachusetts every day.  There would need to be some other rule 
used to test whether the nexus is sufficient and, if so, to measure the 
resulting share of income apportioned to Massachusetts.  New York’s 
convenience of the employer test is such an apportionment rule.48  The 
New York rule asks if the worker is not at her employer’s location for 
the employer’s convenience.  If the answer is “no,” then, for the day in 
question, the income is apportioned to New York. 
But how much of nexus is sufficient for purposes of the Due Process 
Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause?  I have no bright line rule 
to propose, just as there is no bright line rule for other nexus and 
related jurisdictional questions.  If an individual is, in a conventional 
sense, based out of an office located in a state, even if the individual 
never sets foot in that state, that state should have nexus.  Consider a 
junior lawyer working remotely.  At least for now, there will likely be 
 
 46. Formally, New York’s convenience of the employer test is an apportionment 
rule for source income. 
 47. And again, to be clear, if they become permanent remote workers, then 
Massachusetts still has a claim under some circumstances. 
 48. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 132.18(a) (1995). 
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a place in physical space that contains more of the lawyer’s supervisors, 
co-workers, and support staff than any other place.  The state that 
contains that space, at least, has nexus because of the employee’s 
substantial virtual presence in the state. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DOES NOT MEAN OPTIMAL: OTHER OPTIONS 
As discussed supra, the current constitutional rules are correct, and 
the current New York and Massachusetts rules are constitutional under 
those rules.  Indeed, the New York rule is better than those of many 
other states that rely on physical presence precisely because it does 
not.49  Nevertheless, the New York approach may not necessarily be 
the best as a matter of policy. 
Consider the following not-so-hypothetical and only somewhat 
stylized scenarios.  In the first scenario, Google opens up a new office 
in New York that only has space for 100 employees.50  Google, in fact, 
has 100 employees who regularly come to the office, and they are all 
commuters from New Jersey.  Under the current regime, New York is 
the source for all that income, and, in effect, New Jersey will receive 
very little income tax from these residents even though New Jersey has 
a reasonable claim to tax a substantial portion of that income. 
In the second scenario, suppose this New York Google office hires 
100 entirely remote employees.  If they are considered fully remote, 
and as such their location is at the convenience of the employer, then 
New York will receive no income tax at all from these new employees 
— even though, as explained at the outset, the logic of agglomeration 
indicates that New York does have a claim to tax some of that income. 
In the third scenario, suppose Google adds 25 office spaces in New 
York and 100 employees who are formally based out of the New York 
office, with the expectation that each of the remote employees come to 
the office about 25% of the time.  In this scenario, there would likely 
be a battle over whether New York can tax these employees at all (the 
taxpayers’ presumable position) or whether New York can tax all of 
their income (perhaps New York’s position).  A different approach — 
 
 49. See Ellen S. Brody & Cory M. Paul, In Defense of the “Convenience of the 
Employer” Test, 12 COLUM. J. TAX L. (2020), 
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/taxlaw/announcement/view/350 
[https://perma.cc/EWV8-XCZU]. 
 50. See Matthew Haag, Manhattan Emptied Out During the Pandemic. But Big 
Tech Is Moving In., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/nyregion/big-tech-nyc-office-space.html 
[https://perma.cc/W4ZE-YTX3]. 
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which may be how the matter is resolved under current New York law51 
— would be that 25% of these remote employees’ income would be 
sourced to New York. 
Apportioning 25% of the remote workers’ income to New York is 
not a perfect solution, to be sure, but it is reasonable — so reasonable 
that it makes one wonder about the first two scenarios where 
apportionment did not seem to have a role.52  But I think it should.  
Returning to the second scenario, it seems that New York has some 
claim to the income that remote employees earn through taking 
advantage of New York’s agglomerations.  An apportionment solution 
would seem appropriate here, and evolving law and practice involving 
the corporate income tax suggests how this might be implemented.53  I 
am assuming that some agglomeration will continue, and thus large 
multistate employers will have agglomerations of employees.54  For 
example, if Google were to have 10% of its workforce in New York and 
then have a certain number of permanently remote employees 
reporting to multiple offices, then apportioning 10% of the remote 
employee’s income to New York seems reasonable and appropriate.55 
 
 51. See OFF. OF TAX POL’Y ANALYSIS TECH. SERVS. DIV., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
TAX’N & FIN., NEW YORK TAX TREATMENT OF NONRESIDENTS AND PART-YEAR 
RESIDENTS APPLICATION OF THE CONVENIENCE OF THE EMPLOYER TEST TO 
TELECOMMUTERS AND OTHERS (2006). 
 52. Apportionment is currently standard in special cases, such as athletes. See 
Timothy P. Noonan & Doran J. Gittelman, Taxing Times to Be a Telecommuter: 
Convenience Rules During COVID-19, TAX NOTES ST. (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/taxing-times-be-telecommuter-
convenience-rules-during-covid-19/2020/09/17/2cyh2 [https://perma.cc/YB3S-XD9H]. 
 53. This proposal is similar to and inspired by one Ed Zelinsky made. See generally 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the 
Double Taxation of Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota 
Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533 (2014). However, Zelinsky proposed to use 
apportionment to divide up residence, not source — as for source, he seemed to believe 
a physical presence rule is required. He submitted an amicus brief on behalf of New 
Hampshire. See Brief of Professor Edward A. Zelinsky as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, New Hampshire v. 
Massachusetts, No. 220154 (Dec. 10, 2020); see also SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1. 
 54. In fact, a collateral benefit of re-thinking the sourcing rules could be to 
encourage de-agglomeration. After all, before the pandemic and recession, there was 
great concern about too much concentration in large urban areas. 
 55. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, MODEL GENERAL ALLOCATION & 
APPORTIONMENT REGULATIONS WITH AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED FOR ADOPTION BY 
THE COMMISSION 80–81 (2017), https://www.mtc.gov/getattachment/Events-
Training/2017/Special-Meeting/FINAL-APPROVED-2017-Proposed-Amendments-
to-General-Allocation-and-Apportionment-Regulat.pdf.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/A9VY-W7WY] (regulating and apportioning income based on 
proportion of payroll). There is a certain circularity here given that it is known where 
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The same is true for the first scenario.  The operation of the 
residence principle under current law is paradoxical.  On the one hand, 
the resident state can tax a resident on all of her income, which seems 
like quite a lot, and likely more than can be justified from a God’s eye 
view (does no other state contribute anything?).56  Yet the source rule 
typically also attributes 100% of income to the source, again more than 
can be justified from a God’s eye view.  And thus, the norm that each 
state gives tax credits as to taxes paid to the source state means that the 
resident state often gets very little.  In the current litigation, we could 
re-characterize New Jersey’s position as saying “enough is enough” — 
it is one thing for New York to get first crack at the income of physical 
commuters, but too much to also get first crack at the income of 
workers who are temporarily working remotely.  This complaint makes 
sense as a matter of policy, though, as already explained, it is not 
persuasive as a matter of constitutional law.57 
Now, as to the first scenario, there is a question of how to apportion 
the income of commuters.  A first step is to consider what would 
happen if there were one metropolitan area government covering New 
York and New Jersey — that government would be entitled to tax 
100% of the employee’s income.  What to do if there are two 
governments?  One very rough solution would be to split the income 
50–50, 58  though a lot of other divisions could be defended.  For 
instance, perhaps the source jurisdiction should get two-thirds of the 
 
some employees are located — hence it is crucial for this proposal that agglomerations 
continue, if perhaps in different forms and locations. 
 56. In a sense, this winner-takes-all source rule is another example of the flexibility 
of the command that a tax be apportioned. The Court has long accepted that the sales 
tax need not be apportioned. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 
175, 186 (1995) (“We have . . . consistently approved taxation of sales without any 
division of the tax base among different States . . . .”). The Court’s position can be 
understood on two related grounds. First, the Court understands the pragmatic 
difficulties the state would encounter as to apportioning some forms of income. 
Second, because of the widespread use of credits, this seeming violation of the 
apportionment principle does not offend against the core value the Court is concerned 
about: non-discrimination against interstate commerce. See Joondeph, supra note 25, 
at 181–82. 
 57. Another way of putting this Essay’s constitutional argument would be that if 
apportionment were required in this case, then it would call into question other areas, 
like the sales tax, where the Court has relaxed the apportionment requirement when 
there is no discrimination. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 58. In Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, the Supreme Court approved the 
exercise of limited extra-jurisdictional authority by a city over a neighboring 
unincorporated community against an Equal Protection Clause challenge. See 438 U.S. 
60, 61–63 (1978). Note that as part of the Court’s approved structure, those subjected 
to extra-jurisdictional authority still needed to pay fees to the city, but at half the rate 
of city residents. 
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income based on the argument that the residence jurisdiction can also 
levy a property tax to pay for local services. 
New Jersey currently taxes commuters into New Jersey on all of 
their source income, and so benefits from the same rule that costs it 
revenue.  But even if New Jersey moved to an apportionment regime, 
this would not help New Jersey taxpayers unless New York did so as 
well.  This collective action problem does not mean that the Court 
needs to put its thumb on the scale in this murky area.  Rather, the 
Court needs to allow states to negotiate and, ideally, prompt 
congressional action.59  Neither is wholly impossible.  As to the states 
acting, consider for example that it is not clear if New York will lose 
from a shift to an apportionment regime of the type outlined above if 
current trends continue.  It is precisely because of this veil of ignorance, 
i.e., it being unclear which jurisdictions will do better and which will do 
worse, that the states might be amenable to moving to an 
apportionment regime themselves or accepting a broad apportionment 
regime imposed by Congress.  If the Court imposes a physical presence 
rule, particularly one based on due process, then such development 
would be impossible.60 
CONCLUSION: THE COURT SHOULD NOT DICTATE A RULE 
At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth, the courts needed to adjust to the rise of large multistate 
enterprises.  How does one reasonably tax a railroad?  The notion of 
dividing up the enterprise’s income by formula was new, but it worked 
and was upheld.  States already tax individuals on the basis of days 
worked in one state or another.  It will require another shift to 
 
 59. Developing what Congress should do is beyond the scope of this Essay, though 
I think a uniform apportionment approach is the proper reform. Congress certainly 
should not itself impose a new physical presence test, as current proposals before 
Congress would. See American Workers, Families, and Employers Assistance Act, S. 
4318, 116th Cong. (2020) (broader relief bill); Remote and Mobile Worker Relief Act 
of 2020, S. 3995, 116th Cong. (2020) (remote worker bill). 
 60. In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, the Court ruled for the taxpayer but only on 
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, which gave Congress the chance to craft a 
different (better) rule. See 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Despite repeated attempts, Congress 
could not do so because of divisions between the states and different industry groups. 
It seems very likely that the same veto points would have the same effect (not 
legislation) if the Court again looks to Congress to fix its mistakes. The difference 
between ruling for New Hampshire in this case on the dormant Commerce Clause and 
maintaining current law and ruling against New Hampshire is that once New 
Hampshire and its amici win, then there will be no need for many states to negotiate 
further. Under the current regime, every state is both a potential winner and loser and 
hence the possibility of progress. 
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understand when and how states can fairly and reasonably tax workers 
who are virtually present in one state or another.  In this Essay, I have 
not argued exactly what this new regime should look like.  Rather, I 
have argued that the courts — and especially the Supreme Court — 
should not hamper the emergence of this solution by imposing a novel 
physical presence requirement on the taxation of individual income. 
 
 
